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This study focuses on trust formation and development in global buyer-supplier relationships. Trust affects all 
business relationships, especially global business-to-business (B2B) transactions due to the distances between 
buyers and suppliers. We use information signaling theory to examine how information indices and signals affect 
buyers’ trust in suppliers in global B2B commerce. Specifically, we examine how buyers’ trust is affected by (1) 
their perceptions of the national integrity and legal structure of suppliers’ country, and (2) third-party 
verifications of suppliers on B2B exchanges. Because buyer-supplier relationships usually evolve over time, we 
study how the effects of indices and signals change as the number of transactions between the partners 
increases. A survey of global organizational buyers finds that perceptions of national integrity, legal structure, 
and supplier verifications are all positively related to buyers’ trust. However, the number of prior transactions 
between buyers and suppliers moderates the impact of perceived legal structure on buyers’ trust. 
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1. Introduction   
This paper examines trust formation and development in e-commerce transactions between buyers 
and suppliers from different countries. In existing research on trust in transactional exchanges, 
trading partners are generally based in the same country. Yet globalization is changing who and 
where the trading partners are. The world is “flattening” (Friedman, 2005) as technology drives and 
facilitates the globalizing of culture and markets. Globalization involves more than reducing technical 
barriers and transaction costs; it also requires human interaction across cultures and national 
practices. Even with enabling technology and lower transaction costs, global trade still requires two or 
more people or firms to interact to develop a cooperative venture across borders. We look at a 
prototypic example of globalization facilitated by information technology – business-to-business (B2B) 
e-commerce – where buyers and suppliers across the globe exchange goods and services using 
information systems, such as online exchanges. These exchanges aggregate, make, and facilitate 
markets (Bakos, 1998; Dai & Kauffman, 2002), and help firms bypass traditional distribution channels 
and extend their reach globally (Senn, 2000). We study how the perceived country and firm 
characteristics of trading partners influence trust formation and development on online exchanges. 
 
Buyers’ trust in suppliers is critical in all commerce, but particularly e-commerce, due to more 
pronounced information asymmetry, where buyers have incomplete information about suppliers. 
Under these conditions, buyers risk selecting incompetent or opportunistic suppliers. This risk 
impedes transactions between buyers and suppliers. (The risk is not one-sided because suppliers 
also face problems such as non-payments by buyers.) In such situations, trust is “an important 
lubricant” for economic exchanges to take place (Arrow, 1974, p. 23). The separation in time and 
space between buyers and suppliers in cross-border e-commerce raises the risks associated with 
information asymmetry and, consequently, increases the value of trust. 
 
One way to increase buyers’ trust when there is information asymmetry is to close the information 
gap. In markets suffering from information asymmetries, buyers can gather information about 
suppliers (Eisenhardt, 1989), and suppliers could reassure potential buyers of their abilities and 
intentions by providing credible information to reduce the asymmetries (Nayyar, 1990). There are two 
types of information suppliers can provide: indices and signals (Spence, 1973). Indices are supplier 
attributes that are inherently fixed or difficult to alter (e.g., the suppliers’ country of origin). In contrast, 
signals are characteristics that suppliers can more easily invest in or acquire (e.g., web-seals that the 
suppliers can buy). The aphorism “talk is cheap” captures the idea that signals must go beyond the 
supplier saying “You can trust me” to be credible; effective signals must create a separating 
equilibrium (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993) where it is costly for untrustworthy suppliers to acquire the 
signals. Collectively, indices and signals influence buyers’ trust in suppliers only if they are costly to 
change (indices) or acquire (signals). 
 
Using Spence’s (1973) distinction, we examine how information indices and signals influence e-
commerce buyers’ trust in suppliers. First, how do suppliers’ country characteristics influence buyers’ 
trust? Individual suppliers cannot easily change their country’s reputation, which is based on public 
opinion and the behavior of many other suppliers. While a supplier could disguise its country of origin 
or relocate to another country, such moves are costly, challenging, and potentially disruptive to its 
business operations or existing industry ties, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Hence, we consider suppliers’ country of origin as an information index. In particular, we focus on the 
extent to which buyers’ trust is affected by their perceptions of the national integrity and legal 
structure of the suppliers’ country. 
 
Second, how do signals acquired by suppliers affect buyers’ trust, particularly in B2B exchanges? 
Many exchanges provide tools such as feedback mechanisms to help trading partners evaluate each 
other’s trustworthiness (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004; Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou 
& Gefen, 2004). Some B2B exchanges also offer verification or web-seal services that suppliers can 
use to verify information that they provide. These services help to assure buyers that the information 
about verified suppliers’ is authentic. Do such services increase buyers’ trust? Previous studies that 
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examine how web-seals affect buyers’ trust h inconclusive results. In this study, we propose 
conditions for web-seals to be effective trust-building mechanisms. 
 
Third, when do country attributes and web seals have more or less influence on buyer trust? 
Specifically, could the effectiveness of perceived country attributes and supplier verification be 
moderated by past transactions between buyers and suppliers? Examining this question 
complements previous research that looks at initial trust formation in e-commerce (e.g., Lim, Sia, 
Lee, & Benbasat, 2006; McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002b; Stewart, 2003). Surprisingly, we 
show that buyers’ own experiences with suppliers do not necessarily diminish the value of trust-
enhancing indices and signals. 
 
This study makes three contributions to trust research. First, by examining how both information 
indices and signals serve as antecedents of trust, this study provides a more complete and 
comprehensive understanding of the role that signaling theory plays in trust development than past 
research does. Spence’s (1973) theory is about information indices as much as it is about information 
signals. However, existing trust research that applyies signaling theory focuses only on information 
signals, such as sellers’ reputation (e.g., Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006) or competitors’ prices (e.g., Trifts & 
Häubl, 2003). In contrast, information indices as antecedents of trust have received little attention. 
 
Second, we investigate antecedents of trust that are salient in cross-border, global B2B e-commerce 
contexts. This focus contrasts with most existing research that focuses on localized e-commerce 
where buyers and sellers are in the same country (e.g., Balasubramanian, Konana, & Menon, 2003; 
Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 2003; Lim et al., 2006; McKnight et al., 2002b; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006; 
Stewart, 2003; Sun, 2010). Localized and globalized transactions have different implications for the 
formation and impact of trust. In localized e-commerce, trading partners in the same country share 
common knowledge about cultural and legal structures, ways to enforce contracts, and access to 
legal recourse if transactions fail. Moreover, trading partners can more easily gather information 
about each other’s competencies and reputation. Such conditions, which facilitate trust formation, are 
more rare in globalized e-commerce, which makes it more difficult to establish trust in this context. 
Furthermore, buyers’ trust in suppliers during cross-border transactions may be influenced by factors 
that are otherwise not salient in localized e-commerce contexts. Our focus on such transactions fills 
an important gap in our knowledge of online trust. 
 
Finally, we examine the moderating role of past transactions on buyer-supplier trust. When assessing 
suppliers’ trustworthiness in the early stages, buyers draw inferences from various sources, including 
the characteristics of the suppliers’ country. Repeated transactions help buyers to accumulate 
knowledge about their suppliers, and may reduce the influence of country characteristics on buyers’ 
trust. We find that past transactions do mitigate some, but not all, impacts of country characteristics 
on buyers’ trust. This suggests that although suppliers can build up trust through repeated 
transactions, factors that are outside their direct control also affect buyers’ trust in them. This finding 
has important implications for firms and policy makers. 
2. Trust 
We define buyers’ trust in a supplier as the buyers’ willingness “to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intention or behavior of” the supplier (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998, p. 295). Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) identify three components of trustworthiness: 
ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability is the supplier’s skills and competencies in meeting the 
buyer’s needs. Ability is thus context-dependent. In the case of B2B transactions, the buyer would 
focus on the supplier’s ability to satisfy their purchase requirements such as quality, timeliness, and 
cost. Benevolence is the overall goodwill of the supplier towards the buyer. A benevolent supplier 
would not behave opportunistically (in Williamson’s (1975) sense of opportunism) towards the buyer 
for their own benefit. Rather, the supplier is concerned for the buyer’s well-being. Integrity is the 
supplier’s adherence to principles (e.g., being honest and fair) that are acceptable to the buyer. The 
supplier’s integrity is judged by the consistency in their behaviors, the credibility of their 
communication, and their commitment to justice and fairness (Mayer et al., 1995). 
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We focus on interorganizational trust in this study. This trust can emerge from prior history and 
expectations of continued relations between the buyers and suppliers (Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). 
Past interactions provide opportunities for partners to build knowledge about each other (Koehn, 
2003; Ratnasingam, 2005) and affect their satisfaction and trust in each other (Kwon & Suh, 2004; 
Selnes, 1998). Expecting continuity in a relationship improves buyer-supplier trust by extending the 
time horizon for mutual benefits and discouraging opportunistic short-term gains (Aulakh, Kotabe, & 
Sahay, 1996; Poppo et al., 2008). 
 
Interorganizational trust affects the organization and coordination of economic activities (McEvily, 
Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003). It affects transaction costs (Chiles & McMackin, 1996), governance choice, 
exchange performance (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008), information sharing (Dyer & Chu, 2003), and 
negotiation and conflict (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998) between the buyer and supplier. 
Interorganizational trust also has positive transactional effects. Buyers’ trust in suppliers is positively 
related to the buyers’ anticipated future interaction with the suppliers (Doney & Cannon, 1997; 
Pavlou, 2002) and increases their commitment to and cooperation with their suppliers (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994). Buyers also allocate a higher share of their business to suppliers whom they trust 
(Doney, Barry, & Abratt, 2007). 
3. Antecedents of Buyers’ Trust 
In most interorganizational transactions, buyers are concerned with micro, supplier-level 
characteristics, such as the level of specific investments made by suppliers (Heide & John, 1990) or 
the suppliers’ customer orientation (Doney et al., 2007). However, in international sourcing, buyers 
are also concerned with macro, country-level characteristics, such as the political environment, 
business practices, and regulations in the supplier’s country (Birou & Fawcett, 1993; Min, 1994; Min & 
Galle, 1993). Therefore, it is important to examine both micro (supplier-level) and macro (country-
level) factors in global B2B commerce. 
 
Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) provides a framework to holistically examine how both micro and 
macro factors affect buyers’ trust in suppliers. Information signals encompass micro, supplier-level 
factors (since suppliers can manipulate their individual characteristics), whereas information indices 
encompass macro, country-level factors (since individual suppliers cannot change these factors at 
their own discretion). 
3.1. Information Indices: Perceived National Integrity and Legal Structure 
Information indices are observable, fixed, relatively unalterable attributes of an individual, such as 
race or nationality (Spence, 1973). Earlier research has shown how foreign partners’ nationality – 
and the corresponding value systems, cultural traits, and institutions – affects others’ prior 
expectations about their behaviors (Ariño, de la Torre, & Ring, 2001). Country of origin influences 
evaluations of products, people, and firms (Bilkey & Nes, 1982; Madon et al., 2001; Zaheer & 
Zaheer, 2006), and firms from countries that are viewed as untrustworthy may be perceived as 
untrustworthy (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006). 
 
Given the forces of globalization and proliferation of online B2B exchanges, buyers are increasingly 
exposed to prospective suppliers from different countries with different business practices and 
orientations (e.g., Ariño et al., 2001; Hofstede, 1980; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). In the context of global B2B 
e-commerce, two indices that are associated with suppliers’ country of origin may be especially 
important: national integrity and legal structure. National integrity is the extent to which typical actors 
in a particular country are presumed to adhere to some set(s) of moral or ethical principles in their 
actions (e.g., fairness and honesty towards others). Legal structure broadly refers to the rules and 
regulations in a country that govern relationships between entities (e.g., individuals, firms, 
organizations). These indices respectively relate to the social and formal conditions in partners’ 
countries, which are important considerations in cross-border relationships such as international joint 
ventures (e.g., Holton, 1989; Luo, 2007) and trade (Birou & Fawcett, 1993). Because individual 
suppliers cannot easily alter societal norms or modify business regulations on their own, national 
integrity and legal structure are informative and should affect buyers’ beliefs about suppliers (Spence, 
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1973). Specifically, perceptions of social and formal norms in a supplier’s country help to reduce the 
information asymmetry about the supplier’s behaviors and shape a buyer’s expectations about the 
supplier’s trustworthiness (e.g., Bachmann, 2001; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006)1
 
. 
Our concepts of national integrity and legal structure have parallels with the notions of situational 
normality and structural assurance, respectively. These latter notions have often been used to explain 
online trust (e.g., Chau, Hu, Lee, & Au, 2007; Gefen et al., 2003; McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 
2002a, 2002b, 2004; Ou & Sia, 2010). Situational normality is the belief that the Internet environment 
is in proper order and success in online transaction is likely because the situation is normal or 
favorable. For example, buyers have higher trust in a retailing website when the nature of interaction 
with the website is typical of other similar websites (Gefen et al., 2003; Ou & Sia, 2010). Structural 
assurance refers to the belief that “structures like guarantees, regulations, promises, legal recourse, 
or other procedures are in place to promote success” in e-commerce transactions (McKnight et al., 
2002a, p. 339). An online store with sufficient encryption and security capabilities, for instance, is 
perceived to provide a secured transaction environment, which improves consumers’ trust and 
purchase intention (Chau et al., 2007; Ou & Sia, 2010). However, there is a key distinction between 
situational normality and structural assurance on one hand and national integrity and legal structure 
on the other. Situational normality and structural assurance pertain more to the channels in which the 
online transaction occurs, whereas national integrity and legal structure concern the environment the 
trading partners are in. Consider a buyer who finds suppliers from different countries on an online 
exchange. The buyer’s situational normality and structural assurance beliefs about the exchange do 
not vary by suppliers – their perception about whether the exchange is a favorable and safe channel 
is the same for all suppliers. However, the buyer’s perceptions of national integrity and legal structure 
in different countries are likely to vary and affect the buyer’s relationships with suppliers at the dyadic 
level on the exchange. This is the aspect of situational perceptions that we look at in this study. 
Because the context of most research in online trust is localized e-commerce (where buyers and 
sellers are from the same country), the relationship between buyers’ trust and their perceptions of 
foreign suppliers’ country has received little attention. Yet given how e-commerce facilitates 
international trade in today’s economy, understanding this relationship is important. 
3.1.1. Perceived National Integrity 
Most studies of integrity concentrate on how individual actors’ integrity affects the trust others place in 
them. Trust in trading partners can also be related to the perceived level of integrity in the society 
(i.e., national integrity) to which they belong (Fukuyama, 1995; Mackie, 2001). As noted above, 
perception of national integrity relates to perceived social norms in suppliers’ country. When buyers 
perceive that norms in a supplier’s country encourage positive behaviors such as cooperation or 
honesty, they expect the supplier to adhere to these norms. Furthermore, societal norms can act as a 
powerful form of social capital that inhibits deviant actions (Coleman, 1988; Doney, Cannon, & 
Mullen, 1998). The higher the national integrity of a country, the less likely any particular supplier will 
be to commit deviant actions that would sully its reputation. Conversely, in a country with lower level 
of national integrity, deviant behaviors may be more accepted or tolerated. 
 
Thus, perceived national integrity in a supplier’s country provides information about expected supplier 
behavior, and shapes a buyer’s beliefs about the moral character of typical suppliers in that country. 
These expectations and beliefs, in turn, affect the buyer’s cognition-based trust in a supplier’s 
reliability and dependability (McAllister, 1995). Suppliers in countries with higher perceived national 
integrity may be seen to be more likely to adhere to moral or ethical norms and show individual 
integrity. The country’s norms also deter deviant supplier behavior. Therefore, buyers are likely to 
trust suppliers in countries with higher national integrity. 
 
                                                     
1  There are other considerations influencing cross-border relationships, such as exchange rate fluctuations, and logistics support for 
longer supply lines (Birou & Fawcett, 1993). While these factors affect buyers' choice of suppliers, they are not relevant to buyer-
supplier trust. Buyer can hedge exchange rate risk in futures markets, and use insurance markets and global logistic companies to 
help handle international logistics. Presently, we do not have sufficient theoretical rationale to explore whether and how these 
factors affect suppliers’ competency, benevolence, and/or integrity, or buyer-supplier trust at dyadic levels. Hence, we focus on 
buyers’ perceptions of national integrity and legal structure in suppliers’ country in this study. 
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H1: The perceived level of national integrity in the supplier’s country is positively related 
to the buyer’s trust in the supplier. 
3.1.2. Perceived Legal Structure 
Trust in transactional relationships also depends on stable legal, political, and social institutions (Lane 
& Bachmann, 1996). As an economy moves from local to national markets, transactions span longer 
social and geographical distances, which requires institutional, formal trust (Zucker, 1986). Extending 
this line of argument, we expect institution-based trust to play a significant role when transactions 
take place in international markets. 
 
The legal structure of a supplier’s country provides information about the formal norms in the suppliers’ 
country, and shapes buyers’ expectations of suppliers’ behaviors in two ways. First, institutional rules 
and regulations in a country affect various facets of business operations and the types of firms that can 
operate. For example, when a country has formalized licensing policies that govern businesses 
formation and operation, opportunities for those that do not meet the requirements to operate are 
reduced. A buyer may thus expect suppliers from countries with effective business laws and regulations 
to be more competent. This is consistent with Zucker’s finding that the “emergence of licensing 
standards … increased the certainty of performance characteristics” (1986, p. 94). Licensing provides 
the buyer some assurance of a licensee’s ability to fulfill their purchase requirements. 
 
Second, a country’s legal structure affects the extent to which contracts are enforceable, which 
provides effective legal recourse when disputes arise. Contract laws are broad societal guarantees 
needed by buyers and suppliers. The availability and effectiveness of these formal mechanisms are 
important to foreign buyers since trade disputes are more likely to occur given the greater separation 
in time and space of cross-boundary transactions. Furthermore, more market-oriented societies with 
more non-familial/tribal transactions have developed institutions to punish those who are not fair and 
trustworthy (Henrich et al., 2010). Suppliers may be deterred from behaving opportunistically or 
dishonestly when such legal mechanisms are in place and enforced. A supplier that operates in such 
an environment could be expected to be more benevolent and ethical. 
 
Therefore, perceptions about legal structure affect expectations about the types of market participants 
that one is likely to encounter. A buyer may expect a supplier from a country with strong legal 
structure to be more trustworthy. With stronger legal structures, “undesirable entities” (i.e., those with 
low ability, integrity, and/or benevolence) are also expected to self-select out from participating in the 
market given their inability to meet legal requirements or concern for legal penalties for misbehavior. 
 
H2: The perceived level of legal structure in the supplier’s country is positively related to 
the buyer’s trust in the supplier. 
3.2. Information Signals: Supplier Verifications and Web Seals 
Signals are information that a supplier can send to better communicate their ability, benevolence, or 
integrity to the buyer. For such signals to be credible, the cost of signaling must be negatively 
correlated with the capability being signaled (Spence, 1973). Consider, for example, the provision of 
product warranties by suppliers. For warranties to effectively signal supplier quality, the costs of 
providing warranties must be high for low-quality suppliers, and low for high-quality suppliers. 
 
Effective signals create what is known as a separating equilibrium, where high-quality and low-quality 
suppliers have incentives to choose different signals (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993). Buyers can use 
effective signals to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality suppliers. Ineffective signals 
create a pooling equilibrium, in which high-quality and low-quality suppliers share incentives to invest 
in the same signals. Buyers are then unable to differentiate the suppliers using those signals. 
 
In global B2B e-commerce, many exchanges offer services, such as third-party verifications of 
suppliers and web seals, as trust-building signals. These signals can play important roles in buyer-
supplier trust. B2B exchanges typically maintain low entry costs for suppliers to increase their pool of 
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suppliers and raise the liquidity and activity levels among the exchanges’ users. The costs for 
suppliers to join an exchange can range from nothing (free membership) to between US$300 and 
US$7,500 per annum (paid memberships). Table 1 shows the annual paid membership fees (in 
addition to free membership options) in three B2B exchanges (as of November 2008). These 
membership fees are relatively low compared to suppliers’ annual sales volumes or the values of 
typical B2B orders. The ease and affordability of exchange memberships make it easier and attractive 
for a supplier to (1) engage in identity theft/misrepresentation, where it intentionally and wrongfully 
submits information of a legally existing supplier, or (2) act as a phantom supplier by creating an 
account for a nonexistent company. Buyers purchasing from such suppliers face the risks of non-
performance and usually have limited legal recourse. It is difficult to locate or take legal 
actionsagainst a nonexistent company in a foreign country. Moreover, due to the distance between 
trading partners in global B2B exchanges, buyers have difficulties verifying suppliers’ identities, which 
affects their trust in these suppliers. 
 
Table 1. Annual Paid Memberships in Three B2B Exchanges 
B2B Exchange Annual Membership Fee (US$) 
Alibaba.com (www.alibaba.com) $600 for TrustPass; $7,300 for Gold Supplier 
EC Plaza (www.ecplaza.com) $420 
Gsm Exchange (www.gsmexchange.com) $380 
 
Therefore, buyers must rely on B2B exchanges to verify the suppliers’ identities. For a fee, a supplier 
can initiate a third-party verification check through a B2B exchange. This verification check is often 
out-sourced to independent companies, which verify that particular supplier on the exchange is a 
registered company. In addition, these services also verify information posted by the supplier in the 
exchange by inspecting the supplier’s production capabilities, premises, and factories. Such 
verifications signal the legality of the supplier and the authenticity of the information about them in the 
exchange. A supplier who passes the verification check usually receives a web seal on their 
company’s profile page in the B2B exchange, which indicates that the information has been verified. 
Typically, the web seal is valid for one year, after which the supplier needs to be re-verified. 
 
The mere presence of web seals, though, may not lead to higher trust. Some studies show that Better 
Business Bureau Online seals reduce the risk perceived by consumers (Grazioli & Javenpaa, 2000), 
while other studies find that seals of approval, privacy seals, and industry seals do not significantly 
affect customer trust (Fisher & Chu, 2009; Houston & Taylor, 1999; McKnight et al., 2004; Ou & Sia, 
2010; Pennington, Wilcox, & Grover, 2003). The mixed results from these studies raise an important 
question about when web seals serve as effective trust-enhancing signals. We believe there are two 
essential conditions for web seals to improve buyer-supplier trust. 
3.2.1. Condition 1 
Does a particular web seal create the necessary separating equilibrium for it to be a credible signal? 
When the costs to obtain verification web seals are substantial, they provide credible signals. Even 
though the fees to initiate verification checks may be relatively low, the costs associated with having 
the documentation and capabilities to meet the verification requirements are often high. For instance, 
to pass the verification checks, suppliers must register their business and subject it to regulations, 
demonstrate that they have the production capacity, and/or show the certifications they claim (e.g., 
ISO 9001). Those who cannot incur these costs would either fail the verification checks or avoid 
undertaking them. Moreover, third-party companies that provide verification services have a 
continuing reputational stake in the verifications being accurate and untainted. This stake in their 
reputation is of greater value than acting opportunistically to help any particular supplier. As such, 
independent verifications are conducted with care. Thus, third-party verifications serve as implicit 
guarantees (Parkhe, 1998) and contribute to the formation of firm-specific trust (Zucker, 1986), just as 
outside auditors do in the context of managing the principal-agent problem in management settings 
(Antle, 1982, 1984; DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002). 
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3.2.2. Condition 2 
The presence of a separating equilibrium, however, may be a necessary but insufficient condition for 
a web seal to be an effective signal. For the web seal to engender trust, buyers must care about the 
characteristics that are being qualified and signaled. McKnight et al. (2004) suggests that a possible 
reason why TRUSTe, a privacy web seal, did not improve consumer trust in their study was that the 
respondents did not consider privacy to be an important web problem. As we point out earlier, the 
authenticity of counterparties’ identities and claims are essential in B2B relationships. Heide and John 
(1990) found that increased verification efforts by OEM buyers increased their joint action with the 
supplier (e.g., in the areas of component testing, planning, and forecasting). Similarly, Gefen (2004) 
found that quality certifications increased client trust in ERP software vendors. Because third-party 
supplier verification creates a separating equilibrium (see Condition 1 above) and is important to 
potential buyers in B2B commerce, we posit that: 
 
H3: Supplier verification is positively related to the buyer’s trust in the supplier. 
3.3. Effects of Indices and Signals on Trust over Repeated Interactions 
Previous research has examined how initial trust formation is affected by institutional mechanisms 
(e.g., McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Stewart, 2003; Zucker, 1986) or the specific use of 
web-seals (e.g., McKnight et al., 2004; Pennington et al., 2003). However, do factors that influence 
trust early in a buyer-supplier relationship have the same effect later in the relationship? Do the 
effects of trust indices and signals change as buyer-supplier relationships develop? These are 
important questions because buyer-supplier relationships can and do evolve over time. 
 
When there are no transactions between the buyer and supplier, categorization processes such as 
stereotyping should affect the levels of trust between them (McKnight et al., 1998). At this initial stage of 
their relationship, buyers may expect a supplier to perform or behave like typical suppliers in that country. 
These expectations are shaped by their perceptions of national integrity and legal structure. Thus, when a 
buyer is unfamiliar with a supplier, information indices influence the buyer’s trust in the supplier. 
 
However, while information indices provide some indications of the typical suppliers’ quality, the buyer 
gains knowledge about the specific supplier through first-hand, repeated interactions (Koehn, 2003; 
Ratnasingam, 2005). Cooperative history between partners in international alliances affects their trust 
in each other (Parkhe, 1998). With repeated transactions, buyers should rely less on their perceptions 
of the supplier’s country (i.e. information indices) in evaluating the supplier’s trustworthiness. Instead, 
they should base their evaluation on past performance of the supplier (Ariño et al., 2001; Lane, 1998; 
Zucker, 1986). Thus, we hypothesize that the influence of information indices on buyer’s trust decays 
with more transactions between the buyer and supplier. 
 
H4a: The effects of the perceived level of national integrity in the supplier’s country on 
the buyer’s trust should decline as the number of transactions increases. 
 
H4b: The effects of the perceived level of legal structure in the supplier’s country on the 
buyer’s trust should decline as the number of transactions increases. 
 
Do information signals in the form of supplier verifications and web-seals also become less influential 
with more transactions? Given the different levels of firm-specific information that indices and signals 
provide, we believe that there are structural differences in how these informational sources affect the 
development of interorganizational trust. Indices are generic and provide little firm-specific 
information. When only information about a supplier’s location is available, a buyer would treat the 
supplier as typical of firms with similar attributes in that location (Spence, 1973). Direct experiences 
with the supplier, however, allow the buyer to move from an average impression of the supplier’s 
quality to a more precise assessment. Relative to indices, signals provide more firm-specific 
information. Furthermore, because signals are in the firm’s control, the absence of a signal in itself is 
also a signal, albeit a potentially counter-productive one. For instance, companies tend to purchase 
only from suppliers who are verified or qualified in order to maintain corporate governance and 
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manage liability risks. In our case, the legality of the supplier and authenticity of their claims 
(ascertained through third-party verifications) are important criteria for the buyer regardless of the 
length and strength of the buyer-supplier relationship. The buyer may interpret that something is 
amiss when a long-term supplier is no longer verified – for example, they may wonder whether the 
supplier’s license has been revoked or whether the supplier’s  production capacity has changed. 
Trading with this supplier would increase the buyer’s exposure to risk2
 
. This response is similar to 
market reactions when experienced professionals (e.g., lawyers or doctors) and established 
institutions (e.g., schools) lose their licenses or accreditations. 
Therefore, unlike country-level indices, we do not expect repeat transactions between buyers and 
suppliers to moderate the influence of supplier-specific signals on buyers’ trust. These signals provide 
critical information about individual suppliers, and should remain relevant and important even when 
the buyer has first-hand, direct experiences with the suppliers. 
4. Method 
4.1. Overview 
We conducted an online survey of buyers on a global B2B exchange in September 2008. This 
exchange, started in the late 1990s, is operated by a publicly listed firm in Asia. By 2010, it had more 
than three million international users in its member base. The exchange handles products in multiple 
industries, including agriculture, electronics, and textiles. Buyers and suppliers can search for and 
post products, request quotes for price and terms, and contact one another through the exchange. 
The exchange offers various services for suppliers, such as premium membership (US$4,500 per 
annum) and third-party verification services (US$1,400 per annum)3
 
. It also provides services such as 
banner advertising and reports on individual verified suppliers. 
To develop the survey instrument, we first pre-tested using four organizational buyers from three 
countries. We obtained feedback about the structure, questions, and cognitive load of the survey from 
these buyers and refined the instrument. Next, we conducted four rounds of pretests that involved 
600 randomly selected active buyers in the B2B exchange. Active buyers are those who had posted 
at least one buying request in the exchange and had logged in at least once within the three months 
before the survey. Since communication on the exchange (and in international trade) is primarily in 
English, we did not translate the instrument into various languages. 
 
Two weeks after the final round of pretesting, the B2B exchange randomly selected and invited 5,250 
active buyers (excluding those in the pretests) to take part in the actual survey. We gave respondents 
two weeks to complete the survey. The B2B exchange sent a first reminder email one week after the 
initial invitation, and a second reminder email two days before the survey ended. To assure the 
buyers of their confidentiality and anonymity, we informed them that their responses would be sent 
directly to the research team, and that the exchange would only receive aggregated results and not 
individual responses. In addition, we collected no identifying information during the survey. To further 
encourage participation, respondents who completed the survey received a US$20 credit to purchase 
reports from the exchange. 
 
Our survey used a within-subject design. We asked the buyers to list company names or initials of 
two suppliers whom they would consider for an imminent corporate purchase4
                                                     
2  On February 21, 2011, Alibaba.com announced that about 1% of its verified suppliers engaged in fraud against its buyers. These 
fraudulent suppliers evaded the third-party verification process with the help of some Alibaba.com employees. Following the 
announcement, Alibaba.com’s market capitalization dropped by almost US$1b, and its CEO and COO were replaced (although 
Alibaba.com’s internal investigation confirmed that these executives were not involved in the incident). This incident shows that the 
market places a high value on verified suppliers. 
. At least one of the 
3  These rates are correct as of November 2008. 
4  Traditionally, respondents are asked to identify purchase decisions that they have been involved in (e.g., Doney & Canon, 1997). 
In such cases, it is possible that the measured post-transaction trust could differ from the unobserved pre-transaction trust. For 
instance, a buyer may have a high level of trust in a particular supplier before a transaction. However, due to a below expectation 
performance by the supplier, the buyer’s trust in this supplier may be lowered after the transaction. To overcome such issues, we 
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suppliers needed to be a participant in the exchange so that we could examine the influence of third-
party verifications. Buyers not making such a purchase could exit the survey and still receive a US$20 
credit from the exchange. Buyers whose purchase decisions met these criteria provided information 
on each supplier’s verification status (conditional on the supplier being listed in the exchange) 5
 
, 
evaluated each supplier’s performance in past transactions (if any), and rated their trust in each 
supplier. Finally, we asked the buyers for their perceptions of the national integrity and legal structure 
in each supplier’s country. 
Two hundred and eighty-seven buyers completed the survey, which provided information about 574 
suppliers (two suppliers per respondent). The effective response rate is difficult to determine as not all 
the 5,250 buyers sampled were making an imminent purchase on the exchange during the survey 
period. The exchange found 19.95 percent of active buyers sent at least one enquiry to suppliers in a 
two-week period. Using this type of query as a proxy for whether a buyer was making an imminent 
purchase, the relevant sample size for this study is 1,048 buyers (5,250 x .1995) and the effective 
response rate is 27.39 percent. 
 
Appendix A shows the characteristics of our buyers, which includes their location and product 
category of their imminent purchases. The average buyer in our dataset had three to five years of 
B2B e-commerce experience. On average, the buyer’s company had between 10 and 19 employees 
and sales between US$500,000 and US$999,000 in the previous financial year. The buyer had on 
average purchased from between one and four other suppliers that are from the referent supplier’s 
country. The median estimated transaction value of the imminent purchase was US$30,000. The B2B 
exchange reported that these respondents’ characteristics and transaction values are representative 
of those in the exchange. Forty-six percent of buyer-supplier pairs in our sample had prior 
experiences with each other (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Prior Transactions Between Buyers and Supplies 
Number of past transactions Percentage 
No prior transaction  54% 
Between 1 and 3 transactions  26% 
Between 4 and 6 transactions  10% 
Between 7 and 9 transactions  4% 
Between 10 and 19 transactions  2% 
20 transactions or more  4% 
Note: Base on 574 pairs of buyer-supplier relationships in our sample.  
 
Because the B2B exchange did not provide information about non-respondents, we could not compare 
respondents’ attributes with those of non-respondents. Instead, to check for non-response bias, we 
compared buyers who responded before the final reminder with those who responded after. There were 
no significant differences between early and late respondents in company’s sales, number of employees, 
purchase value, respondents’ education, working experience, and B2B e-commerce experience. This 
suggests non-response bias is not a problem in our sample (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). 
4.2. Measures 
Appendix B presents the items that this study used. When appropriate, we specified the suppliers’ 
company name or initials in the questions’ stem by using information provided by the buyers. This 
clarified the questions to the buyers, especially since they had to evaluate two suppliers in the survey. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
asked buyers to consider an imminent purchase that they were making. This approach allows us to better relate (pre-transaction) 
trust to purchase intention. Although there is a possibility that the buyers’ trust in suppliers was biased (where more trustworthy 
suppliers were being considered for the transaction), we employed a within-subject research design to control for this potential bias 
(see Appendix G). 
5  As multiple suppliers could use the same company name, it was not feasible for the B2B exchange to provide information of the 
supplier’s verification status. Therefore, we relied on buyers’ input for this information. 
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4.2.1. Purchase Intention 
Although this study focuses on antecedents of trust, we also measured outcomes of trust so that we 
could relate our findings to past research and estimate the expected value of information indices and 
signals. Because buyers evaluated their supplier before actual purchases, a relevant outcome of trust 
is the likelihood of purchasing from that supplier. 
 
Because the B2B exchange did not track actual transactions, and because some buyers also 
evaluated suppliers that were not participating on the exchange, we could not use archived purchase 
data in our analysis. Additionally, because buyers spend different amounts of time making their 
purchase decisions, it would have been challenging to follow-up with them to get information about 
their actual purchases. Therefore, we asked buyers to estimate on a 5-point Likert scale the likelihood 
of making the imminent purchase with the particular supplier. Verbal statements of purchase 
intentions are excellent predictors of actual purchase behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheppard, 
Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
4.2.2. Buyer’s Trust 
We used nine items from Mayer and Davis (1999) to measure the buyer’s trust in the supplier. 
Sample survey items include “Supplier X is well qualified” and “Supplier X would not knowingly do 
anything to hurt me”. We changed one of the items to focus on the supplier’s capabilities (instead of 
skills as per Mayer and Davis’ (1999) measures) to make the question contextually relevant. We also 
asked about the extent to which the supplier can be trusted. 
4.2.3. National Integrity 
We used two 5-point Likert scale items to measure the buyer’s perceptions of the national integrity in 
a particular supplier’s country: the likelihood that suppliers in that country would behave with integrity 
and do the right things in business deals. These items are similar to those that Morgan and Hunt 
(1994) use in their study of dyadic retailer-supplier relationships; however, our items focused on the 
buyer’s perception of all suppliers in the country instead on the individual focal suppliers. Appendix C 
shows the average perceived national integrity ratings for the 50 supplier countries in our sample. 
4.2.4. Legal Structure 
The measure of the buyer’s perceptions of the legal structure in a supplier’s country came from two 
sources. The first comprised three 5-point Likert scale items to measure the buyer’s confidence in the 
legal systems in that country, and the perceived effectiveness of the laws and regulations in that 
country to govern the suppliers’ operations and resolve business disputes, respectively. 
 
The second source was the 2007 corruption perception index (CPI), administered by Transparency 
International. The CPI is a composite index that provides information about perceptions of corruption 
within countries. The index score ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption). The 2007 CPI is 
based on 14 sources that originate from 12 institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, and the World Economic Forum. The average correlations between the 
sources are .77, which suggests high overall reliability of the CPI (Lambsdorff, 2007). Moreover, Herzfeld 
and Weiss (2003) found that a positive relationship between countries’ CPI scores and the degree to 
which their citizens are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes. Hence, CPI is a relevant external measure of legal structure perception for this study. 
 
Appendix C shows the average perceived legal structure ratings and CPI scores for the 50 supplier 
countries in our sample. These two measures correlate at .44 (p < .01), which supports the validity of 
our survey measure of legal structure perceptions. 
4.2.5. Supplier Verification 
We asked the buyer to indicate the supplier’s verification status, provided that the supplier is listed in the 
exchange. The buyer indicated “not sure” if they could not recall this information about the supplier. The 
verification status indicator takes the value of 1 if the supplier was verified and 0 otherwise. 
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4.2.6. Past Transactions 
We accounted for the buyer’s experience with the supplier using the number of transactions between 
them over the last 12 months, as reported by the buyer. 
4.2.7. Supplier’s Performance 
To control for supplier’s performance, we asked the buyer to compare the referent supplier to other 
suppliers in terms of three performance criteria: price, product availability, and delivery (Doney & 
Cannon, 1997). We measured the responses for each on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 
performing much worse than other suppliers to performing much better than other suppliers. The 
neutral point on the scale was that the supplier’s performance was equal to other suppliers’. The 
buyer indicated “not sure” if they were unable to ascertain the supplier’s relative performance. 
4.2.8. Supplier Membership 
We dummy coded supplier memberships to control for different membership types. We categorized 
suppliers who were not on the B2B exchange as non-members. Among suppliers who were listed on 
the exchange, we categorized those with paid memberships as paid members. The buyer indicated 
“not sure” if they could not recall the supplier’s membership type in the B2B exchange. We used 
suppliers on the exchange with free membership or whose membership types buyers could not recall 
as the reference group in our analyses. 
4.2.9. Same Country 
Because cultural or ethnic similarity may influence trust, we controlled for whether the buyer and 
supplier were from the same country using a dummy variable. Since the buyer indicated their and the 
supplier’s countries during the survey, we matched their responses to code this dummy variable. The 
variable takes the value of 1 if the buyer and supplier were from the same country and 0 otherwise. 
4.2.10. China Supplier 
Seventy percent of the suppliers in our sample were based in China, which reflectis the current state 
of international trade where buyers actively source from China. We added a country dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the supplier was from China and 0 otherwise. 
5. Analyses and Results 
Since our respondents were from different countries, we assessed whether we should pool their 
responses in our analyses. We conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess differences among 
respondents between countries (Appendix D). The results show that it is reasonable to pool 
respondents across countries in our analyses. We also assessed the presence of common method 
variance in two ways (Appendix D). First, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test. Second, in a 
stronger, more refined test that fits our research setting, we compared (1) the covariance of buyer’s 
trust in and likelihood of purchasing from one supplier (i.e., within-supplier covariance), and (2) the 
covariance of buyer’s trust in one supplier and likelihood of purchasing from the other supplier (i.e. 
between-supplier covariance). The results from both tests indicate that common method variance is 
not a problem in our data. 
5.1. Structural Equation Modeling 
We analyzed our data using structural equation modeling. Structural equation modeling (SEM) 
provides the flexibility to properly account for measurement error by having multiple indicators per 
latent variable. It also allows us to test the overall model and model the error terms. In addition, we 
can include a consequence of trust (i.e., purchase intention) in the structural model and estimate the 
expected values of trust indices and signal. We did this using the Mplus (version 5.21) software, 
which lets us model interaction using the latent moderated structural equations approach (Klein & 
Moosbrugger, 2000). This approach results in relatively smaller bias of structural parameter estimates 
and higher power to detect interaction effects than partial least square (Schermelleh-Engel, Werner, 
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Appendix E shows the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of the items. We mean-centered the 
items for national integrity, legal structure, and past transactions before creating the interaction terms. 
Using maximum likelihood, we simultaneously estimated the measurement and structural models. To 
reduce the number of parameters to estimate, we assigned the ten survey items that measure buyer’s 
trust into three parcels (Trust-A (4 items), Trust-B (3 items), and Trust-C (3 items)), and used them as 
indicators of the latent variable buyer’s trust. Each parcel’s score is the average score of the assigned 
items. The latent variable legal structure comprises four indicators – the three survey items and the 
supplier’s country CPI score. We fixed the error variance of single-indicator variables (i.e., purchase 
intention and past transactions) with the assumption that the reliability for each of these indicators is .85. 
Using the Spearman Brown prophecy formula and Cronbach’s α for the measure of buyer’s anticipated 
future purchase in Doner and Canon’s (1997) study, we estimated a reliability of .90 had we used a single-
item scale to measure purchase intention. Our assumed reliability of .85 is therefore conservative. 
 
Also, because each respondent in our dataset provided two supplier-observations, individual 
respondents’ observations may have correlated errors. To obtain robust variance estimate, we 
clustered the observations by respondent to appropriately adjust the standard errors (Wooldridge, 
2002). Lastly, when estimating the structural model, we treated “not sure” responses for supplier’s 
price, product, and delivery performances as missing data. We assumed these responses to be 
missing at random, which makes the use of maximum likelihood estimation with estimation of missing 
data values appropriate and strongly preferable to listwise case deletion (Schafer & Graham, 2002). 
5.2. Measurement Model 
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis and computed the Cronbach’s α of the multi-items 
constructs in our model (Appendix F). The model fit is not significant (χ2 = 55.20, d.f. = 48, p > .10), 
and the other fit indices also indicate good model fit (CFI = .99; RMSEA = .02; SRMR = .03). All items 
loaded on their respective constructs. The Cronbach’s α estimates suggest the items have good 
internal consistency. Good convergent validity is shown by higher correlations between items 
reflecting the same construct than correlations between items reflecting different constructs (see 
Appendix E). We tested discriminant validity of our constructs using a chi-square difference test 
(Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991). For each pair of constructs, we ran a chi-square difference test that 
compared an unrestricted model (where correlation of the constructs was freely estimated) and a 
restricted model (where correlation was fixed to unity). In all pair-wise comparisons, the two models 
differ significantly on the chi-squared difference test (p < .001), with the unrestricted models having 
better fit, which supports the discriminant validity of the constructs. 
5.3. Structural Model 
We estimated a baseline model with only the main effects. The test of fit for this model is significant 
(χ2 = 352.04, d.f. = 113, p < .01), but the other fit indices indicate adequate model fit (CFI = .92, 
RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05). Based on the modification indices, we added covariance between trust 
and purchase intention, and between the CPI and whether the supplier is from China. A buyer’s trust 
and purchase intention may share common causes that we did not measure (e.g., buyer’s 
commitment to supplier). Also, given that the proportion of China suppliers in our dataset is high and 
that the CPI is a country-level score, it is reasonable to allow their error terms to correlate. We re-
estimated the model with these modifications (Model 1 in Table 3). Although the test of fit is still 
significant (χ2 = 209.36, d.f. = 111, p < .01), the other goodness of fit indices improved (CFI = .97, 
RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .04). 
 
We next added two interaction terms, “national integrity x past transactions” and “legal structure x 
past transactions”, to the structural model (Model 2 in Table 3). Including these interaction terms 
makes the second model a non-nested model relative to the first model, and these two models have 
overlapping but non-identical variance-covariance matrices (Vandenberg & Grelle, 2009). We 
compared the models’ Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to 
assess whether including the interaction terms is appropriate. These information criteria reward a 
goodness of model fit and penalize a lack of model parsimony, and the model with the smaller AIC 
and BIC is the better one (Vandenberg & Grelle, 2009). The AIC declined from 20686.42 in Model 1 
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to 19482.23 in Model 2, and the BIC (adjusted for sample-size) declined from 20785.38 to 19559.98. 
The relatively large reductions in information criteria values support the inclusion of these two 
interaction effects in our structural model. 
5.4. Results 
Figure 1 presents the hypotheses testing results using Model 2 in Table 3. After controlling for the 
supplier’s performance, the supplier’s membership category, whether the buyer and supplier are from 
the same country, and whether the supplier is China based, we found that the favorable perception of 
national integrity had a positive effect on buyers’ trust in the supplier (β2 = .18, p < .05). However, this 
perception did not become less influential with increasing transactions (β3 = .10, p > .10). Therefore, 
H1 is supported but H4a is not. Although the perception of national integrity perception appears to 
have modest statistical impacts, its economic impacts are substantial and meaningful. We discuss the 
practical impacts of our findings in Section 6.2. 
 
Table 3. Structural Model Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
β1: Buyer's trust → likelihood of purchase  0.94** (0.11) 0.93** (0.11) 0.92** (0.11) 
β2: National integrity → buyer's trust  0.17* (0.08) 0.18* (0.08) 0.18* (0.08) 
β3: National integrity x past transaction → 
buyer's trust  - 0.10 (0.07) 0.10 (0.07) 
β4: Legal structure → buyer's trust  0.06 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 
β5: Legal structure x past transaction → 
buyer's trust  - -0.09* (0.05) -0.11* (0.05) 
β6: Supplier verification → buyer's trust  0.20+ (0.11) 0.24* (0.11) 0.12 (0.14) 
β7: Supplier verification x past transaction 
→ buyer's trust  - - 0.07 (0.06) 
β8: Past transaction → buyer's trust  0.06* (0.03) 0.06* (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 
Controls    
β9: Supplier's performance → buyer's trust  0.59** (0.12) 0.58** (0.12) 0.59** (0.11) 
β10: Non member → buyer's trust  0.03 (0.07) 0.05 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 
β11: Paid member → buyer's trust  -0.15+ (0.09) -0.16+ (0.09) -0.15+ (0.09) 
β12: Same country → buyer's trust  0.06 (0.11) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.12) 
β13: China supplier → buyer's trust  0.04 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 
χ2 (d.f.)  209.36 (111), p < .01 - - 
CFI  0.97 - - 
RMSEA  0.04 - - 
SRMR  0.04 - - 
AIC 20686.42 19482.23 19482.90 
BIC 20785.37 19559.98 19561.83 
Note: + p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The software package (Mplus) does not provide goodness of fit indices for Models 2 and 
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Figure 1. Summary of Results 
 
We also found that (i) the perceived legal structure positively impacted buyers’ trust when the buyer 
had relatively few prior interactions with the supplier, but that (ii) the effects of perceived legal 
structure on buyers’ trust weakened as the number of interactions increased. The number of prior 
buyer-supplier transactions negatively moderated the relationship between perceived legal 
structure and buyer’s trust (β5 = -.09, p < .05), although the positive main effect of perceived legal 
structure on trust was not statistically significant (β4 = .05, p > .10). These results collectively 
support H2 and H4b. In addition, buyers’ trust was higher in suppliers who had been verified by a 
third party compared with those who were not verified (β6 = .24, p < .05), which supports H3. Lastly, 
a buyer’s trust in a supplier was positively related to the likelihood that the buyer would purchase 
from that supplier (β1= .93, p < .01). This result is consistent with other studies on outcomes of trust 
(e.g., Doney & Cannon, 1997; Pavlou, 2002). 
 
We then added the interaction supplier verification x past transactions in Model 3. Since AIC and BIC 
were higher in Model 3 than in Model 2 (see Table 3), there is no evidence to suggest that Model 3 is 
a better model (Vandenberg & Grelle, 2009). This interaction term was also not significant (β7 = .07, p 
> .10), which implies that the impact of a supplier’s verification status on buyer’s trust does not 
diminish with more transactions between them. 
5.5. Robustness Analyses 
We conducted several analyses to check the robustness of our results (see Appendix G for details). 
First, unobserved effects such as priming, social desirability, and buyer heterogeneity may bias our 
results. For example, respondents might give positive evaluations of suppliers because they were 
strongly considering these suppliers in their purchases. The respondents’ trust in individual suppliers 
might also be affected by their disposition to trust (Balasubramanian et al., 2003; McKnight & 
Chervany, 2001; McKnight et al., 1998) or by their trust in the exchange (Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou & 
Gefen, 2004). Our within-subject design, where each respondent evaluated two suppliers, allows us 
to account for these unobserved effects using a random effects model. The results using random 
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Second, we replaced survey data about supplier’s membership types with available data from the 
exchange. We also checked the sensitivity of our SEM results to different model specifications and 
assumed reliability of single-indicator variables. Finally, we ran a multi-level mixed effects model 
because the survey responses were nested within buyers. The results in these analyses are 
consistent with the main results discussed above. 
6. Discussion 
Information systems researchers have examined the roles and impacts of interorganization systems 
such as electronic data interchange (e.g., Mukhopadhyay, Kekre, & Kalathur, 1995) and electronic 
infomediaries (e.g., Ghose, Mukhopadhyay, & Rajan, 2007). Online B2B exchanges are also 
interorganization systems that help buyers and suppliers search for and connect with each other 
(Pavlou, 2002). Yet firms do not establish relationship with each other simply because the systems to 
do so are in place. In this study, we examined factors that affect the formation and development of 
interorganizational relationships on online exchanges, particularly in a global setting. 
 
Using information signaling theory (Spence, 1973), we treated perceived level of national integrity and 
legal structure in the supplier’s country as indices that are difficult for suppliers to alter, and third-party 
verifications and web seals on B2B exchanges as costly signals that suppliers can manipulate at their 
discretion. Our results show that supplier indices and signals have positive effects on buyers’ trust. 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggested that, with increased  experience (more past transactions), the effect 
of indices such as legal structure and national integrity would decline. This would be evidenced by 
negative coefficients for interactions of the respective indices and past transactions. We did find such 
an effect for legal structure by past transactions (β5= -.09, p < .05). However, the estimated coefficient 
for national integrity by past transactions was not significant (β3= .10, p > .10), which suggests that 
national integrity is still a consideration even with much past experience. A possible explanation for 
this non-significant effect is that national integrity and individual suppliers’ integrity are more closely 
associated than we expected – buyers may expect social norms to strongly influence individual 
suppliers’ behaviors, even for those suppliers whom they have transacted with. Since integrity is a 
key component of trust, and repair of trust due to integrity-related violations (e.g., dishonest behavior) 
is difficult (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2004; Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2009), buyers’ perceptions of national 
integrity may still matter even when they have completed many transactions with the suppliers in the 
past. Finally, we also found that buyers’ trust positively affects their supplier-selection decisions. 
Buyers were more likely to purchase from suppliers whom they trust more (β1 = .93, p < .01). 
 
Apart from third-party verifications, another potential signal for suppliers in B2B exchanges is paid 
membership. Surprisingly, we found a weak negative relationship between buyer’s trust and paid 
membership (β11 = -.16, p < .10), which indicates that buyers may distrust suppliers that are on paid 
memberships. We also observed this phenomenon among B2B exchange users. For instance, a 
participant in an online community shared their experiences with suppliers on paid membership (Gold 
membership) in a B2B exchange (Alibaba.com): 
 
Bear in mind that I have successfully dealt with an Alibaba Gold member, and still do this 
day, so I was taken in by the belief that Gold membership meant that the company I was 
dealing with would be more genuine, than say a free member seller. I now know that 
this is not the case (emphasis added) (Robbobb, 2007). 
 
Our results and the anecdotal evidence suggest that genuine suppliers may not effectively 
distinguish themselves from non-genuine ones by subscribing to paid memberships – in fact, such 
services seem to have adverse effects on genuine suppliers. Unlike verification services, paid 
memberships usually just require suppliers to pay a fee, which may not be effective barriers to 
untrustworthy suppliers. Membership fees could be too low to separate types of suppliers, which 
leads to a pooling equilibrium. 
 
Our results add to our understanding of cross-border transactions on online B2B exchanges. 
Regardless of whether B2B transactions occur within or across borders, or through online exchanges 
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or physical channels, buyers look for certain qualities in suppliers – competency, integrity, and 
benevolence. However, it is more challenging to identify these qualities in cross-border e-commerce 
due to information asymmetry in online markets. Moreover, research in localized B2B e-commerce 
typically focuses on technological structure, particularly the situational normality and structural 
assurance of the Internet or platforms (e.g., Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou & Ratnasingam, 2003; 
Ratnasingam, 2005). However, these factors, cannot explain why a buyer’s trust in suppliers from 
different countries may differ on a B2B exchange. A favorable and secured online platform may not 
be a sufficient condition for global e-commerce transactions to occur because a buyer’s trust in 
foreign suppliers and the buyer’s purchase intention also depend on factors that are external to the 
platform. Our results show that it is necessary to examine social-economic characteristics in partners’ 
countries in globalized B2B e-commerce. 
 
Furthermore, supplier verifications may be more salient when cross-border transactions take place on 
online exchanges instead of through traditional channels. Earlier studies, particularly those that 
predate the Internet era, have considered the importance of foreign supplier certifications in 
international sourcing through physical channels (e.g., Birou & Fawcett, 1993; Scully & Fawcett, 
1994). In these cases, an implicit assumption is that the suppliers’ certifications are authentic. 
However, the importance of authenticating trading partners’ information, is a relatively new 
phenomenon with the proliferation of online platforms (e.g., Basu & Muylle, 2003; Lee, 2002). As we 
note earlier, the relatively low costs of exchange memberships lead to problems such as 
misrepresentation and phantom suppliers. Thus, in the context of exchange platforms, the 
authenticity of a firm’s information could be as important as the information itself. 
6.1. Theoretical Implications 
With the Internet and e-commerce technology, organizations can now easily look beyond their local 
markets for new buyers and suppliers. While participating in the global marketplace is attractive, the 
risks and uncertainties that come with it are qualitatively different from those that arise in domestic 
exchange. By focusing on globalized B2B e-commerce, we see important factors of trust that are not 
salient in localized commerce of any kind. Our findings show that perceptions of country and supplier 
attributes influence buyers’ trust. It is important to account for such indices and signals when studying 
information asymmetry and signaling. Indices are often treated as given. This study suggests that they 
have informational impact precisely because they are relatively unalterable by suppliers. 
 
We expected that perceptions of supplier-country attributes would have less effect as the buyer 
gained experience with the supplier. The actual picture is more complicated. Whereas the effects of 
legal structure on a buyer’s trust diminished with repeated transactions, national integrity remained 
influential. These differences may be due to the different basis for each perception. Perceived 
national integrity is a cognition-based trust mechanism. It influences judgment of trustworthiness via a 
categorization process, where an entity in an untrustworthy culture is expected to be untrustworthy 
(Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006). In cross-border e-commerce, even though a supplier is highly rated in 
terms of their ability, benevolence, and/or integrity based on their performance in prior transactions, 
the larger context may make trusting the supplier unwise or indicate the need for lower trust. For 
example, when opportunism is common or highly tolerated in a particular culture, high integrity and 
benevolence of an individual may be insufficient assurance that the individual will not be opportunistic 
(Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999). Therefore, the stereotyping of counterparts’ national characteristics 
not only affects initial trust formation (Ariño et al., 2001), but it also influences subsequent trust 
development as relationships between the partners grow. 
 
Perceived legal structure, in contrast, is an institution-based trust mechanism. Institution-based trust 
is important when there are limited prior exchanges between buyers and suppliers (Zucker, 1986). 
However, third-party, institutional mechanisms provide fewer cues about individual suppliers’ 
competency. While the legal structure and licensing requirements in a country provide general 
indications of the quality of typical suppliers, a buyer learns about the ability of a particular supplier as 
the exchanges between them increase. Furthermore, although the enforceability of contracts and 
legal recourses are important in cross-border transactions, these considerations are more important 
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when the partners are unfamiliar with each other. In inter-organizational relationships, buyers and 
suppliers may avoid invoking legal sanctions when trade disputes occur, as doing so is costly and 
interferes with their desire to continue doing business with one another (Macaulay, 1963). Instead, 
they try to resolve disputes through direct negotiations. Thus, when buyers and suppliers can assess 
each other’s trustworthiness through direct means and exchanges, institution-based trust 
mechanisms become less influential. As a result, buyers’ reliance on the legal system in suppliers’ 
countries decreases with repeat transactions. Work in this area should account for the length and 
strength of buyer-suppliers relationships when examining institution-based trust. 
 
In addition, this study extends research on how online exchanges mechanisms, such as feedback 
systems, affect a buyer’s trust in the community of suppliers on the exchanges (Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou 
& Gefen, 2004). Just because a buyer trusts the community of suppliers does not mean that they 
have the same level of trust in every individual supplier in that community. Ultimately, trust at the 
dyadic buyer-supplier level plays an important role in shaping individual buyers’ relationships with 
their suppliers. We see here that suppliers can differentiate themselves on an exchange by sending 
credible and important signals of their trustworthiness through third-party verifications. 
6.2. Managerial Implications 
Do the estimated effects in this study have meaningful consequences for buyers and suppliers on 
B2B exchanges and for policy makers? To address this, we estimated the economic impacts of 
supplier verification and changes in perceived national integrity using the SEM results in Table 3 
(Model 2). The expected value of supplier verification on the B2B exchange was 22.32 percent (.93 
(β1) x .24 (β6)) of the transaction value. Using the median transaction value of US$30,000 and 
assuming a supplier is considered for 12 purchases per year on the exchange, the expected value for 
the supplier of being verified was US$80,352 annually6. Since the primary context of this study was in 
cross-border transactions, and perceived country characteristics affect all suppliers within a country, 
we estimated the impact of perceived national integrity on the external trade of an economy. The 
expected value of a .01-point improvement in perceived national integrity (measured on a 5-point 
scale) was .17 percent (.93 (β1) x .18 (β2) x .01) of the total export value of a country. Using the 2008 
trade statistics for China, for instance, a .01-point increase in its perceived national integrity has an 
expected value of US$2.43 billion7
 
. While this figure is only suggestive, it indicates the potential 
impact of even small changes in perceived country characteristics. 
Therefore, suppliers should be aware of how buyers’ perceptions of the legal structure and national 
integrity in their countries affect buyers’ trust. A buyer's trust due to country attributes is essentially 
beyond an individual supplier’s control. Moreover, perceptions of country attributes of a particular 
country may differ among buyers, which makes it more challenging for individual suppliers to come up 
with an optimal strategy to engender and sustain trust. As such, what might be needed is a concerted 
effort to improve the perceived legal structure and national integrity of suppliers at the industry or 
country level. This can sometimes be done through voluntary business associations developing 
accreditation standards and self-regulation. Such improvements can benefit both individual suppliers 
and the respective countries as a whole. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) found that a 10 
percent increase in the level of trust in a society was associated with a .8 percent rise in annual 
growth in per capita income. The analysis in our study also shows that a small change in perceived 
national integrity can have a relatively significant impact on a country’s external trade. 
 
The negative relationship between buyer’s trust and paid membership has important implications for 
B2B exchanges. Paid memberships are important revenue sources for these exchanges. While there 
are other reasons why suppliers subscribe to paid membership, such as to communicate more 
information or enjoy better customer support on the exchanges, it is nevertheless important for 
exchanges to explore how they can help those trustworthy suppliers who take up paid membership to 
                                                     
6  Users’ testimonials in various B2B exchanges indicated that suppliers received between 20 and 200 enquiries per month. Our 
assumption of the supplier being considered for 12 purchases per year is therefore quite conservative. 
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increase the buyers’ trust and eventually sales through their online marketplaces. One suggestion is 
for B2B exchanges to create different classes of paid memberships, and entry into certain 
membership classes requires suppliers to meet additional criteria that credibly signal high 
trustworthiness, such as suppliers’ track record on the exchanges. This could help buyers 
differentiate among suppliers based on paid memberships. 
6.3. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
In this study, we examined the relationship between buyers’ trust and their perceptions of suppliers’ 
country attributes. Reverse causality is a potential problem: a buyer’s trust in a supplier could affect 
their perceptions of the supplier’s country, particularly if that supplier is the only supplier from that 
country with whom the buyer has interacted. Reverse causality becomes less of a problem as the 
buyer interacts with more suppliers from that country. In this study, buyers reported that, on average, 
they purchased from between one and four other suppliers from the referent supplier’s country. 
Therefore, we do not expect that reverse causality was a major problem in this study. 
 
In terms of the theoretical model, a possible extension is to examine the direct and indirect influences 
of industry-level perceptions on buyers’ trust. For example, safety issues in China’s toy and dairy 
industries could have affected the perceived trustworthiness of suppliers in these industries 
(Fairclough, 2007; Chao, 2008). For example, the Dairy Association of China estimated that it would 
take about two years to restore consumer confidence following the food safety incident in 2008, 
where milk and infant formula were adulterated with melamine (Zhou, 2008). There might also be 
spillover effects to other industries in the country, thus indirectly affecting buyers’ perceptions of the 
country attributes. Including perception of industry-level attributes in the model would strengthen our 
understanding of how such higher-level perceptions influence trust at dyadic levels. 
7. Conclusion 
Therefore, is the world really flat as Friedman (2005) asserts? Perhaps less so than Friedman thinks. 
Although physical and geographical boundaries are now less of an obstacle in economic exchanges, 
they still play important roles in economic agents’ attitudes, behaviors, and decisions. Hence there is 
a need to examine how cross-boundaries exchanges and relationships in all commerce are shaped 
by country characteristics. Increasingly, transactions are taking place globally, in B2B commerce and 
elsewhere. Consumers all over the world can now purchase from online retailers based in the US 
(e.g., Amazon.com) or individuals (e.g., through eBay). Yet most research in e-commerce and 
sourcing focuses mainly on deals that occur locally (particularly in the US). Adopting a cross-
boundary and global perspective in e-commerce studies would enrich research and help to further 
maximize the benefits that the Internet and e-commerce bring to the global marketplace. 
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Table A-1. Buyers’ Characteristics (Location, Product Category, Company Size, and E-
Commerce Experience) 
Buyer's continent n Product categorya n No. of employees n 
Africa 46 Agriculture & Food 17 1 to 4 56 
Americas 21 Apparel & Accessories 11 5 to 9 68 
Asia 168 Arts & Crafts 4 10 to 10 61 
Europe 24 Auto parts & Accessories 8 20 to 99 65 
Oceania 28 Bags, Cases, & Boxes 1 100 to 499 24 
  Chemicals 32 500 or more 13 
  Computer Products 13   
  Construction & Decoration 17 Sales in previous year n 
  Consumer Electronics 17 Less than US$100,000 55 
  Electrical & Electronics 28 US$100,000 to US$499,000 71 
  Furniture & Furnishing 2 US$500,000 to US$999,000 40 
  Health & Medicine 18 US$1 million to US$4.9 million 81 
  Lights & Lighting 6 US$5 million to US$9.9 million 15 
  Machinery 31 US$10 million to US$49.9 million 12 
  Metallurgy, Mineral, & Energy 21 US$50 million to US$99.9 million 5 
  Office Supplies 5 US$100 million or more 8 
  Security & Protection 1   
  Sporting Goods & Recreation 4 B2B e-commerce experience n 
  Textile 13 1 year or less 54 
  Tools & Hardware 3 Between 1 and 3 years 85 
  Toys 4 Between 3 and 5 years 52 
  Transportation 4 More than 5 years 96 
  Others 27   
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Appendix B. 
Table B-1. Survey Measures 
Construct Itema 
Purchase intention  Is it likely that you would buy from Supplier X for the purchase that you are 
thinking about?  
Buyer’s trust  To what extent do you agree with the following statements:  
• Supplier X is very capable of performing its job.  
• I am confident about Supplier X’s capabilities.  
• Supplier X is well qualified.  
• Supplier X would not knowingly do anything to hurt me.  
• Supplier X really looks out for what is important to me.  
• Supplier X will go out of its way to help me.  
• I never have to wonder whether Supplier X will stick to its word.  
• Supplier X tries to be fair in dealings with others.  
• Sound principles seem to guide the Supplier X's behavior.  
• Supplier X can be trusted.  
National integrity  In your opinion, how likely would suppliers from Supplier X‟ s country do the 
following:  
• Behave with integrity  
• Do the right things in business deals always, even when no one is 
watching  
Legal structure  How confident are you with the legal system in Supplier X’s country?  
In your opinion, how effective are the laws and regulations in Supplier X’s 
country concerning the following activities:  
• Governing operations of the suppliers  
• Resolving business disputes  
Supplier verification  What is the verification status of Supplier X in the exchange?  
Past transactions  How many times has your company purchased from Supplier X in the last 12 
months?  
Price performance  
 
How does Supplier X compare to other suppliers in terms of price?  
 
Product performance  
 
How does Supplier X compare to other suppliers in terms of product availability?  
 
Delivery performance How does Supplier X compare to other suppliers in terms of delivery? 
Non-member  Is Supplier X  listed in the B2B Exchange? b  
Paid member  What is the membership type of Supplier X in the exchange?  
Same country  Are Supplier X and buyer from the same country? b  
China supplier  Is Supplier X based in China? b  
a “Supplier X” in the question stems is the supplier’s company name or initial as provided by the buyer.  
b Not an actual item in the survey – the value is obtained from the buyer’s responses to items concerning the buyer’s and the 
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Appendix C. 
Table C-1. Average National Integrity, Legal Structure, and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
Scores of Supplier’s Country 
Country National integrity Legal structure CPI n 
Armenia  5.0 4.3 3.0 1 
Australia  4.0 3.7 8.6 4 
Austria  4.0 4.0 8.1 1 
Bahrain  5.0 5.0 5.0 1 
Belgium  3.5 4.6 7.1 3 
Benin  3.0 3.3 2.7 1 
Botswana  2.5 2.3 5.4 1 
Brazil  3.2 2.1 3.5 3 
Bulgaria  3.0 3.0 4.1 1 
Canada  3.5 3.5 8.7 2 
China  3.3 2.8 3.5 403 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  3.0 2.3 1.9 1 
Denmark  5.0 4.3 9.4 1 
Egypt  3.0 2.0 2.9 1 
Finland  5.0 4.7 9.4 1 
France  4.5 4.3 7.3 1 
Germany  4.1 4.2 7.8 9 
Hong Kong  3.5 3.7 8.3 10 
India  3.4 3.3 3.5 34 
Indonesia  3.4 2.5 2.3 4 
Iran  3.0 2.3 2.5 1 
Italy  3.5 3.7 5.2 2 
Japan  4.0 3.7 7.5 1 
Kuwait  4.0 4.0 4.3 1 
Malaysia  2.8 2.8 5.1 2 
Mexico  3.5 3.0 3.5 1 
New Zealand  5.0 4.3 9.4 1 
Nigeria  3.3 3.7 2.2 9 
Norway  4.5 4.3 8.7 1 
Pakistan  3.5 2.9 2.4 3 
Peru  4.0 3.7 3.5 1 
Qatar  4.5 4.7 6.0 1 
Romania  4.0 4.3 3.7 1 
Russia  4.5 3.9 2.3 5 
Saudi Arabia  3.0 3.0 3.4 1 
Singapore  3.0 3.7 9.3 2 
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Table C-1. Average National Integrity, Legal Structure, and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
Scores of Supplier’s Country (cont.) 
Country National integrity Legal structure CPI n 
South Africa  4.5 4.0 5.1 2 
South Korea  3.5 4.0 5.1 3 
Spain  5.0 4.3 6.7 1 
Switzerland  4.5 3.0 9.0 1 
Taiwan  3.9 3.2 5.7 13 
Thailand  5.0 4.0 3.3 1 
Turkey  4.8 4.5 4.1 4 
Ukraine  4.2 4.2 2.7 3 
United Arab Emirates  3.5 3.2 5.7 4 
United Kingdom  3.0 4.2 8.4 4 
United States  4.0 3.7 7.2 19 
Vietnam  3.0 2.7 2.6 1 
Zambia  3.0 2.7 2.6 1 
Note: The items that measure perceived national integrity and legal structure are on a scale of 1 (least favorable) to 5 (most 
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Appendix D. Preliminary Analyses 
Our survey respondents were from various countries in different continents. We used a Kruskal-Wallis 
test to assess whether there are differences among respondents from different countries. We found 
no significant differences in terms of company’s sales (H = 21.66, p > .10), respondent’s working 
experience (H = 18.56, p > .10), and B2B e-commerce experience (H = 13.93, p > .10) among 
respondents from different countries. However, the number of employees in the respondent’s 
company (H = 46.33, p < .01) and their education (H = 52.10, p < .01) are statistically different, which 
reflects differences in economic and social structures across respondents’ countries. Based on these 
results, we believe it is reasonable to pool our respondents across countries. 
 
Next, we assessed the presence of common method variance in our data in two ways. First, we 
conducted Harman’s one-factor test and found that the scale items load onto more than one factor 
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Second, we compared (1) the covariance of buyer’s trust in and likelihood 
of purchasing from one supplier (i.e., within-supplier covariance), and (2) the covariance of buyer’s 
trust in one supplier and likelihood of purchasing from the other supplier (i.e., between-supplier 
covariance). The within-supplier covariance was at least 1.5 times the between-supplier covariance, 
which indicates that common method variance does not appear to account for the relationship 
between buyer’s trust and purchase intention. The within-supplier covariance of buyer’s trust in and 
likelihood of purchasing from the first supplier was .28; the between-supplier covariance of buyer’s 
trust in the second supplier and the likelihood of purchasing from the first supplier was .18. The 
within-supplier covariance of buyer’s trust in and likelihood of purchasing from the second supplier 
was .32; the between-supplier covariance of buyer’s trust in the first supplier and the likelihood of 
purchasing from the second supplier was .11. 
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Appendix F. 
Table F-1. Measurement Model Results 
Construct Item Loading Std. error Cronbach’s α 
Buyer's trust 
 
Trust-A 0.92 0.01 
.94 
 Trust-B 0.93 0.01 
Trust-C 0.91 0.01 
National integrity 
National Integrity 1 0.66 0.07 .69 
 National Integrity 2 0.80 0.06 
Legal structure 
Legal Structure 1 0.59 0.05 
.74 
Legal Structure 2 0.94 0.02 
Legal Structure 3 0.92 0.02 
CPI 0.28 0.04 
Supplier’s 
performance 
Price Performance 0.57 0.06 
.81a 
Product 
Performance 0.87 0.03 
Delivery 
Performance 0.83 0.04 
Chi-square = 55.20, d.f. = 48, p > .10 
CFI = 0.99 RMSEA = 0.02 SRMR = 0.03 
All item loadings are significant at p < .01 
a Using casewise deletion for missing data (i.e. “not sure” responses) 
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Appendix G. Robustness Analyses8
Random Effects Model 
 
We estimated random effects models with buyer’s trust as dependent variable using Stata (version 
10.1). We assumed that the unobserved effects affect a buyer’s evaluations of both suppliers in the 
same manner. For instance, the (unobserved) importance of situational normality or structural 
assurance to a buyer should be the same for every supplier whom they were considering. This 
assumption justifies the use of random effects model to account for unobserved effects (Wooldridge, 
2002) and minimizes the need to include control variables for buyer attributes in our models. We 
standardized items that measured legal structure and national integrity and then averaged to form the 
respective variables. We also standardized the item for the number of past transactions. We recoded 
the responses for each supplier’s relative performance criterion into three dummy variables: (1) better 
than other suppliers, (2) worse than other suppliers, and (3) not sure about the performance, with the 
base category being the neutral “equal to other suppliers” response. We clustered the observations 
by respondent to obtain robust variance estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). Tables G-1 and G-2show the 






































                                                     
8  In the interest of space, we summarize the results for most of the robustness analyses in this appendix. Detailed results are 
available from the authors. 
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Table G-2. Random Effects Model Results 
Dependent variable: buyer's trust 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
γ1: Constant 3.69** (0.10) 3.69** (0.10) 3.69** (0.10) 
γ2: National integrity 0.14** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) 
γ3: National integrity x past transaction - -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.04) 
γ4: Legal structure 0.06 (0.04) 0.08+ (0.04) 0.08+ (0.04) 
γ5: Legal structure x past transactions - -0.06* (0.03) -0.06* (0.03) 
γ6: Supplier verification 0.23* (0.11) 0.23* (0.11) 0.24* (0.11) 
γ7: Supplier verification x past transactions - - 0.08 (0.08) 
γ8: Past transactions 0.08* (0.03) 0.09** (0.03) 0.09** (0.03) 
γ9: Relative price (better) 0.05 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 
γ10: Relative price (worse) -0.04 (0.11) -0.03 (0.11) -0.03 (0.11) 
γ11: Relative price (not sure) -0.04 (0.11) -0.04 (0.11) -0.04 (0.11) 
γ12: Relative product (better) 0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 
γ13: Relative product (worse) -0.69** (0.20) -0.70** (0.20) -0.69** (0.20) 
γ14: Relative product (not sure) -0.26* (0.10) -0.26* (0.10) -0.25* (0.10) 
γ15: Relative delivery (better) 0.35** (0.07) 0.34** (0.07) 0.33** (0.07) 
γ16: Relative delivery (worse) -0.22 (0.16) -0.22 (0.16) -0.23 (0.16) 
γ17: Relative delivery (not sure) 0.09 (0.09) 0.10 (0.09) 0.09 (0.09) 
γ18: Non-exchange member 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.07) 0.04 (0.07) 
γ19: Paid membership -0.11 (0.09) -0.10 (0.09) -0.10 (0.09) 
γ20: Same country 0.05 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) 0.06 (0.12) 
γ21: China supplier -0.03 (0.07) -0.03 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07) 
R-sq (within) 0.27 0.29 0.29 
R-sq (between) 0.40 0.39 0.39 
R-sq (overall) 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Wald χ2 (d.f.) 233.36 (17) 243.19 (19) 246.99 (20) 
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sargan-Hansen statistic 17.61 25.42 25.37 
p-value 0.41 0.15 0.19 
+ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 
Note: Robustness standard errors in parentheses. 
 
We estimated a baseline model with only the main-effects (Model 1), and a model that included the 
national integrity and legal structure interaction terms (Model 2). The Sargan-Hansen statistic does 
not reject the null hypothesis that the orthogonality assumption is valid for both models (test statistic = 
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17.61, p-value = .41 for Model 1; test statistic = 25.42, p-value = .15 for Model 2). This implies that the 
random effects estimator is consistent9
 
. 
The results using SEM (Model 2 in Table 3) and random effects models (Model 2 in Table G-2) are 
consistent with each other. Perception of national integrity was positively related to buyer’s trust (γ2 = 
.13, p < .01), but this relationship was not moderated by past transactions (γ3 = -.01, p > .10). These 
results support H1 but not H4a. We also find that past transactions negatively moderate the 
relationship between perception of legal structure and buyer’s trust (γ4 = .08, p < .10 and γ5 = -.06, p 
< .05). Therefore, H2 and H4b are supported. Similarly, supplier verification had a positive impact on 
buyer’s trust (γ6 = .23, p < .05), which supports H3. 
 
We also examined whether the relationship between supplier verification and buyer’s trust was 
moderated by past transactions. We added the interaction term “supplier verification x past 
transactions” in Model 3 (Table G-2), and found that it was not statistically significant (γ7 = .08, p > 
.10). Once again, there is no evidence that supplier verification becomes less important to a buyer 
with increased transactions. 
Archival Data 
Of the 574 suppliers in our dataset, 439 were listed in the B2B exchange. We could uniquely identify 
194 (44.2 percent) of these suppliers in the exchange’s online directory, and obtain information about 
their membership type and third-party verification status. Excluding cases in which buyers were “not 
sure” about suppliers’ membership types or verification status, 61 percent of the membership type 
indicator and 66 percent of the verification status indicator in our dataset match the information from the 
exchange10
Alternative SEM Specifications 
. These are conservative estimates of correct matches because membership types and 
verification status could have changed between the time the buyer saw the signals and the time we 
obtained the information on the exchange. We checked the robustness of our results by using the B2B 
exchange’s data in two cases: (1) whenever exchange and survey data differed, and (2) only when 
buyers indicated that they were not sure of a supplier’s membership type or verification status. In both 
cases, the results from the recoded dataset are qualitatively similar to those from the original dataset. 
We checked the robustness of our structural model to changes in specifications of the latent Buyer’s 
Trust variable. There are two ways to re-specify buyer’s trust. First, we could directly set the ten 
survey items that measure trust as indicators of buyer’s trust instead of assigning them to parcels 
trust-A, trust-B, and trust-C. Second, we could impose a hierarchical structure for the construct 
buyer’s trust. This is achieved by modeling buyer’s trust as a second-order factor with presumed 
direct causal effects on three first-order factors, and then assigning the ten survey items to these first-
order factors. We estimated our models using these two re-specifications of buyer’s trust and 
obtained results that are similar to our original findings in both cases. Both the re-specified models 
have adequate model fit. The fit indices for the model with the first re-specification were CFI = .93, 
RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04. The fit indices for the model using the second re-specification were CFI = 
.94, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .04. 
 
We also re-specified the measurement model for the latent legal structure variable by using the three 
survey items and removing CPI from our model. The model fit of the resulting structural model was 
                                                     
9  If the orthogonality assumption is not satisfied (i.e., unobserved effects do correlate with independent variables), random effects 
estimators are not consistent but fixed effects estimators are. However, if the orthogonality assumption is satisfied, random effects 
estimators are consistent and also more efficient than fixed effects estimators. The Sargan-Hansen test statistic is a 
heteroskedastic- and cluster-robust form of Hausman test that compares random effects and fixed effects estimators (Schaffer & 
Stillman, 2010). Failure to reject the null hypothesis in the Sargan-Hansen test (as in our case) implies using random effects is 
appropriate. 
10  Using logistic regression, we found that the odds that a supplier was a paid member according to the exchange’s data are three 
times larger when a buyer indicated that the supplier was a paid member than when he indicated that the supplier was not. The 
predicted probability that a supplier was a paid member based on the exchange’s data was .57 when a buyer indicated that the 
supplier was a paid member, and .30 when they indicated that the supplier was not. We could not analyze supplier verification 
data as buyers “predicted” non-verified status perfectly (i.e. when they indicated that a supplier was not verified, this was so 
according to the exchange’s data). Thus, supplier membership and verification status seem to be salient to buyers, and our survey 
data is reasonably robust. 
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adequate (CFI = .99, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .03) and our original results still hold qualitatively. We 
then dropped legal structure from our model and used CPI as the sole proxy for buyers’ perceptions 
of the legal system in suppliers’ country. The estimates for CPI and interaction between CPI and past 
transactions are not significant statistically. Therefore, it is important to measure perceptions of legal 
structure at the individual buyers’ level and not rely on global indices such as CPI alone. 
 
Next, we checked the sensitivity of the SEM results to lower assumed reliability of indicators when 
fixing the error variance of single-indicator variables. We reduced the assumed reliability of these 
variables from .85 to .75 and re-estimated Model 2. The interaction between perceived legal structure 
and past transactions was then weakly supported at .10 level (β5 = -.11, p = .054), while the other 
results continued to hold at same level of statistical significance. 
Multilevel Mixed Effects Model 
Because the observations of suppliers are nested within buyers, we used multilevel mixed effects 
model to check the robustness of our results. In the multilevel model, we allowed random coefficients 
on national integrity, legal structure, supplier verification and past transactions at the buyer level. The 
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